We examine the properties of simple quantity-based monetary policy rules of the kind widely used in low-income African economies. Using a DSGE model and focusing on responses to positive aid shocks, we suggest that policy rules involving substantial reserve accumulation in the face of aid surges serve to ease macroeconomic adjustment to shocks, particularly when a portion of aid is used to support fiscal adjustment. These rules are robust to assumptions about the degree of integration of the domestic public debt market with world capital markets. Although an open capital account facilitates smoother adjustment to temporary aid surges when an aid inflow is fully spent, it exacerbates the adjustment problem when aid is accompanied by fiscal adjustment and hence reinforces the case for a managed float in such circumstances.
Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy in Africa has undergone significant changes in the last decade. Shifts in the macroeconomic orthodoxy in favour of tighter fiscal control and the emergence of low and stable inflation as a central policy objective of governments across the continent have been reinforced by greater institutional independence of central banks and the removal of administrative controls in foreign exchange and financial markets. Together, these have afforded central banks a degree of protection against excessive fiscal pressures and provided them with the instruments with which to pursue their inflation targets. The removal of exchange controls has reduced exchange rate policy to choices regarding the degree of flexibility of a unified exchange rate, while the shift away from interest-rate controls and directed credit has facilitated a move from direct to indirect instruments for controlling overall liquidity, albeit in the context of relatively thin and oligopolistic asset markets.
These institutional changes have occurred against a changing macroeconomic environment across the continent. Many African central banks are currently confronting the challenge of managing rapidly rising primary export prices, often in circumstances where successful adjustment and debt relief programmes have prompted surges in official aid flows. At the same time, and in response to these same developments, short-run private capital inflows have become an important feature of the landscape. In Zambia, for example, foreign investors currently hold around 20% of the stock of domestic government bonds (IMF, 2007a) , while in December 2006, over 80 percent of the subscription to the Government of Ghana's 5-year domestic currency bond issue was accounted for by foreign investors (IMF, 2007b) . Similar developments are occurring elsewhere across the continent.
With these factors generating substantial upward pressure on nominal and real exchange rates, and given concerns about the possible consequences for external competitiveness, central bankers have been increasingly drawn into attempts to prevent the appreciation of the real exchange rate which, in turn, raises questions about the degree to which intervention should be sterilized and hence the trade-off between exchange rate and interest rate volatility.
1 Central banks are actively seeking feasible monetary rules that provide guidance on how to navigate these concerns about the exchange rate without yielding on their inflation objectives. In particular, they are attempting to determine how aggressively they should seek to manage the path of the nominal exchange rate, if at all;
whether there is a role for reserves to smooth the spending response to aid inflows; and whether aid-related liquidity growth should be sterilized through bond sales.
By the end of 2007 only two African countries had sought to resolve these issues by committing themselves to fully-fledged inflation targeting, South Africa, which adopted inflation targeting in 2000 and Ghana which followed suit in May 2007. Elsewhere, however, although many countries are actively considering moves in the same direction, the vast majority maintain what Stone (2003) has labeled 'inflation targeting lite' regimes, typically utilizing a money-based anchor for inflation.
The distinctions between full-fledged and 'lite' regimes are important. The former entails an explicit public commitment to inflation as a nominal anchor, in preference to the exchange rate or some monetary aggregate, and an explicit prioritization of inflation over competing objectives of central bank policy, including output and exchange rate stability. By contrast, although 'inflation targeting lite' regimes also typically announce an inflation target they may retain exchange rate stability and financial stability among their objectives, often reconciled through an IMF-supported financial programming framework (Porter and Yao, 2005) .
Operationally, countries that practice strict inflation targeting almost uniformly employ a short-term interest rate as the primary policy instrument. For this approach to be effective there must be a reliable transmission mechanism from short-term interest rates to expected inflation. But interest rates do not play as central a role in the transmission mechanism in most African economies, consistent with the rudimentary nature of the financial sector. Instead monetary equilibrium tends to play the key role and remains at the core of most programs of monetary management in sub-Saharan Africa. For a given value of expected inflation, the path of velocity is assumed to be fixed, rather than dependent on a nominal interest rate, so that the path of the price level is then determined endogenously, to equalize the policy-determined path of the nominal money supply with the path of real money demand.
Although the choice of operational target often differs sharply between inflation-targeting central banks and those based more loosely on financial programming, it does not constitute an important analytical difference. First of all, unavailability of a policy interest rate does not rule out the setting of available policy instruments to target expected inflation to whatever desired degree of transparency and exclusion of other objectives. Second, even when a policy interest rate is available, the transmission from monetary aggregates to aggregate demand may well be more reliable. Finally, even where a policy interest rate does afford reasonably sensitive control over aggregate demand, a given path for that rate can in principle be accomplished either directly, by controlling the interest rate, or indirectly, by controlling the supply of central bank balances.
The more fundamental difference between these regimes has to do with their choice of nominal anchor and the degree to which they prioritize price stability over other objectives of monetary policy. It is these differences which shape the research programme discussed in this paper. This research --discussed in Buffie et al (2004) , O'Connell et al (2007) and Adam et al (2008) -is fundamentally concerned with integrating these institutional characteristics of African economies into coherent macroeconomic models with the ultimate objective of building a bridge between the policy frameworks currently in use in most of sub-Saharan Africa and the inflationtargeting frameworks that form the analytical core of monetary policy among emergingmarket and industrial countries. To date we have framed the policy question rather narrowly in terms of the conduct of monetary policy in the face of volatile but persistent positive shocks to net aid inflows, such as experienced by a number of countries in subSaharan Africa since the turn of the century. Although it readily extends to the analysis of other shocks and sources of volatility including commodity price shocks, we retain the narrow focus on aid shocks in this paper.
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Our analysis to date suggests that efficient management of aid inflows requires a degree of foreign exchange intervention, particularly when aid is used partly to substitute for domestic deficit financing and where domestic prices are sticky. These results are derived for an environment where countries' whose integration with global capital markets is rudimentary, so that access to global capital markets has tended to run through official aid channels and processes of currency substitution. One consequence of this is that domestic real interest rates can deviate substantially from world interest-parity conditions for extended periods of time.
Recently, however, as we have noted above, de jure capital account openness has become de facto as foreign investors have responded to the compression of risk margins by seeking out ever more exotic markets including the most under-developed African markets. To reflect these recent developments, we modify our basic closed capital account model to allow for capital market integration, albeit limited by considerations of sovereign risk. We show that although an open capital account facilitates smoother adjustment to temporary aid surges when an aid inflow is fully spent, volatility is magnified and the adjustment problems identified in our earlier work are likely to be exacerbated when aid inflows are accompanied by fiscal adjustment. Given this, the case for a managed float in such circumstances is strengthened.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly set the scene and discuss the basic structure of the model. 3 Section 3 then turns directly to the simulations and a discussion of the results. We start with a review of the principal results reported in Adam et al (2008) before turning to the contribution of this paper which is to examine the robustness of our earlier results as foreign participation in domestic debt markets increases. Section 4 concludes.
The Model

Some background considerations
We develop a dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model (DSGE) whose design is inspired by the structure of low-income African countries, the shocks that preoccupy African central bankers, and the institutional environments they operate within. As a result, our model stands in contrast to the contemporary literature on monetary policy in emerging-market economies. In particular, reflecting the nature of the transmission mechanism, there is no policy interest rate in our model. Instead, central banks deploy balance sheet instruments -foreign exchange reserves, base money and bonds.
In this respect, our model shares more with the earlier literature on monetary management in industrial countries (for example, Branson and Henderson 1985) than with contemporary approaches. However, as Woodford (2003) shows, there exists an isomorphism between a now-conventional AS-IS-IR model (where IR denotes the interest rate rule) and the earlier AS-IS-LM style of model. 4 Thus the choice of model is a matter of taste but typically will turn on a practical matter of institutions (i.e. whether a policy interest rate exists).
The simple equivalence is easily derived for a closed economy. To move to an open economy, an equation for exchange rate determination can be added, possibly by assuming UIP or imperfect asset substitution (Cespedes et al, 2003) . These extensions typically entail adding a single equation but two new variables, the exchange rate and reserves. Overwhelmingly, however, the developed country literature conveniently sidesteps the more subtle issue of the added policy instrument, reserves, by assuming that the authorities pursue a pure float (which implies the change in the instrument, reserves, is zero throughout).
While this may be an appropriate simplification for full-fledged inflation targeting it is patently not a good approximation of reality in developing countries in general (see for example Edwards, 2007) , and for those of sub-Saharan Africa in particular where the authorities often reach for exchange rate intervention as the first instrument of choice. It is for this reason we include in our model explicit rules for foreign exchange intervention, which represent our first main point of departure from the literature.
A second and related point is that in our model fiscal policy is not innocuous. With only very recent exceptions (e.g., Benigno and Woodford, 2007) , analytical treatments of inflation targeting tend to assume non-distortionary transfers, so that seigniorage requirements do not complicate the management of monetary policy. In our model, by contrast, the management of seigniorage through the interaction of fiscal policy plays directly on the private sector's portfolio behaviour which in turn shapes the dynamic adjustment to aid (and other) external shocks.
Model specification
Central to the baseline model is a characterization of households' portfolio choices and the financing options facing government which reflects the 'imperfectly open' capital account structures pervasive in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Formally, we work with a simple optimizing two-sector dependent economy model with currency substitution in which both domestic and foreign currencies delivery liquidity services. The representative private agent consumes traded imports and non-traded final goods and accumulates financial wealth in the form of three assets: domestic currency, foreign currency and government bonds. There are no banks in the model, so that money is base money and foreign currency balances are held in non-interest-bearing forms.
The private agent can accumulate or decumulate foreign currency either via transactions with the central bank or through the current account, depending on the exchange rate regime. The private sector's relative demand for domestic and foreign currencies depends on the liquidity services delivered by each and their opportunity costs relative to holding domestic bonds. This is simply the nominal interest rate for domestic money; for foreign currency, the foregone interest rate is modified by the rate of depreciation, providing for a lower opportunity cost if the exchange rate depreciates. The sensitivity of relative currency demand to these opportunity costs depends on both the elasticity of currency substitution and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution in consumption. The higher the degree of substitutability between currencies the more private agents will seek to alter their currency portfolio (and hence the greater the pressures on the nominal exchange rate) in response to shocks. A higher value of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, other things equal, tends to produce greater volatility in consumption and the current account and less volatility in the real interest rate. The settings adopted in this paper correspond to mid-range values from the limited empirical evidence on these parameters. When combined with initial steady state values of inflation and the nominal interest rates, they imply a steady state inflation elasticity of the demand for base money of around 0.5, consistent with most empirical estimates.
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In Adam et al (2008) we assume that, apart from through this currency substitution channel, neither the private nor public sector has direct access to world capital markets. Hence domestic government debt is effectively non-traded and domestic interest rates are not tied down by interest parity conditions. Here we nest this as a special case in a more general model which allows for the possibility of foreign portfolio investment in domestic bond markets (although we continue to assume that the government does not issue foreign currency debt instruments). The economy thus faces an upward-sloping foreign supply of funds schedule whose elasticity is determined by the premium over uncovered interest parity demanded by foreign investors to compensate for sovereign risk. The foreign investor is assumed to hold a home bond whose real yield, denominated in units of the tradable good and assumed independent of developments in the local economy, is given by * *
(1 )
. The foreign supply of funds is defined implicitly by the condition
where e denotes the expected real exchange rate, γ the non-tradable share in the CPI, the 'closed' capital account used in Adam et al (2008) . At the other extreme, as 0 φ → the supply schedule becomes horizontal at the UIP interest rate, corresponding to the case of perfect asset substitutability.
The supply side of the model is simple, reflecting our short run focus. The economy produces exported and non-tradable goods using sector-specific capital and labour, which is intersectorally mobile. The aggregate capital stock is fixed and there is no investment.
Non-traded goods prices are sticky so that the output of non-traded goods is demanddetermined in the short run. In this case, macroeconomic adjustment can then take place off the production frontier, via booms or recessions in the non-traded goods sector.
The model is completed by defining a stochastic process for the external shocks, and a set of policy rules. In this case we limit the sources of external volatility to stochastic shocks in the net aid inflow which follows a stationary AR(1) process around a steady-state mean value equivalent to of 2 percent of GDP. The autoregressive parameter is 0.50.
Policy Rules
We now turn to the macroeconomic policy choices of interest in the analysis of aid shocks. On the fiscal side, our focus is on the financing implications of fiscal policy, and in particular on the consequences of aid-financed deficit reductions. 
Variations in government revenues arising from aid inflows are transferred directly to household by means of variation in transfers.
The instruments of monetary policy are transactions in foreign exchange and government securities with the private sector. To characterize reserve management, we begin with the simplest reaction function that accommodates alternative degrees of commitment to a fixed rate of crawl:
and where x is the steady-state rate of depreciation. To this we add a fixed long-run reserve target , z in order to preserve the stationary structure of the analysis. Finally, we allow for a time-varying reserve target tied to the pattern of fiscal spending out of aid. Reserve policy is therefore
where ( ) α represent looser commitments to the reference rate of crawl, and for 1 0 α = the exchange rate floats. 7 In the floating case, all foreign exchange available to the economy is immediately priced in a competitive foreign exchange market and either added to private foreign currency holdings or absorbed through an increased current account deficit.
We refer to the combination of what we call a buffer plus float. This approach is simple and intuitive: the central bank sells aid dollars in the precise amount required to finance aid-induced spending as it occurs, but floats with respect to all other shocks. In a buffer plus float, any aid that is not spent in the current period is retained as reserves. Of course, if 0 δ = so that aid is always spent immediately, there is no operational difference between a buffer plus float and a pure float. In the presence of deficit-reduction or expenditure-smoothing components, however, a buffer plus float involves a period of potentially substantial reserve accumulation during an aid boom.
Foreign exchange operations are unwound over time, at a rate determined by 2 α . Since private foreign currency holdings return to a steady-state level over time, the long-run reserve target implies that aid is ultimately fully absorbed in current account deficits, regardless of the time pattern of aid-induced public spending and the other parameters of the monetary policy reaction functions. In the simulations reported below, we assume a relatively slow rate of adjustment, setting 2 0.05
The instruments of monetary policy are completed by the rules governing bond operations. A conventional bond reaction function would define bond operations to offset the net impact of domestic credit creation or foreign exchange intervention on the monetary base. In the context of managing liquidity in the face of aid shocks, however, bond operations tend to be geared directly and solely to spending out of aid and actual foreign exchange intervention (rather than to reserve accumulation) to define a bond reaction function of the form
7 Equation (2) In this rule, 2 0 β > allows for a gradual return of bond holdings to a long-run level.
8 It is useful to consider (2) and (3) 
Results
We start by briefly reviewing the central results from our earlier work in which we focus on the properties of three monetary policy rules under different assumptions about the fiscal response to aid inflows and where government bonds are held exclusively by domestic residents. The first two rules are the polar cases of a pure float (i.e. a money anchor) and an exchange rate crawl. In the former case, official foreign exchange reserves are held constant and the growth of the money supply is determined exclusively by the actions of the fiscal authorities. In the latter, the monetary authorities target the nominal exchange rate at the steady-state rate of depreciation, with changes in the money supply arising from intervention potentially being sterilized through bond purchases or sales. The third case, the reserve buffer plus float, entails initially accumulating aid inflows as official foreign exchange reserves and then sterilizing the full domestic currency counterpart of aid-financed non-import spending through foreign exchange sales as it occurs. This rule thus sets a time-varying reserve target corresponding to the unspent component of aid, and allows the exchange rate to float freely once this reserve target is satisfied.
In section 3.1 we examine the properties of these rules in circumstances where, initially, the aid inflow is spent as it is received, and then when a portion of the aid inflow is used to substitute for domestic deficit financing. In Section 3.2 we re-examine these rules in the presence of an open capital account. Finally, in Section 3.3, we explore the characteristics of 'burden sharing' rules that seek to allocate responsibility for liquidity sterilization between foreign exchange intervention and bond sterilization, under both closed and open capital accounts. Throughout this analysis we eschew any formal welfare comparison, preferring to focus on the positive characteristics of the rules. Table 1 reports the simulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the key behavioural variables of the model in response to a positive aid shock equivalent to 2% of GDP (around a steady state mean value of 10% of GDP). For convenience we report the IRFs on impact (t=0) and at horizons t=1, t=2 and t=15 only. The final row of each block reports the theoretical standard deviations of the endogenous variables given the stochastic aid process.
Aid shocks with a closed capital account
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When the fiscal authorities spend all the aid inflow as it is received, domestic financing is fully and continuously insulated (Panels A and B). In this case, full spending implies there is no distinction between a pure float and a buffer plus float. Both, however, entail a different path for the nominal exchange rate and aggregate prices compared to the crawl, at least in the short run. The aid inflow induces a mild real exchange rate appreciation consistent with a pro-cyclical spending boom but while an initial inflationary spike is required under the crawl, the initial adjustment is mildly deflationary under a float as the nominal exchange rate appreciates. In neither case, however, are the effects large; macroeconomic adjustment is largely benign. While the crawl delivers marginally less volatility for both inflation and the real exchange rate, and marginally more current account volatility, the differences between these polar approaches to exchange rate policy are second-order, at least for the parameters of the policy rules considered here.
These similarities disappear when aid is used to provide an element of fiscal stabilization (Panels C to E). When aid substitutes for seigniorage the monetary authorities are confronted with the explicit challenge of how to manage a first-order alteration to the path of domestic financing. Now, the buffer plus float rule is no longer equivalent to a pure float. The pure float implies that the contraction in the fiscal deficit after net budgetary aid is fully met by a contraction in the government's seigniorage requirement for a given stock of domestic debt. As shown in Panel C, the consequences are dramatic: the nominal exchange rate appreciates by more than 13% on impact (compared to an appreciation of around 2% in the corresponding no-deficit reduction case reported in Panel A), and the real rate appreciates by 8% (again compared to 3%). These powerful price effects induce a contraction in non-tradable output of 0.4% on impact compared to an increase of around the same size in Panels A and B. The reason for this outturn is that the reduction in expected inflation as a result of the fiscal adjustment shifts the private sector's asset portfolio decisively in favour of domestic money: given the contraction in the supply of money and the fact that the authorities are not intervening in the foreign exchange market, this requires the nominal exchange rate to overshoot in the short run to restore portfolio equilibrium. Since the nominal appreciation is much larger than the real appreciation required to absorb the aid inflow, non-tradable prices must fall sharply entailing a sharp recession in the non-tradable goods sector.
Against this counterfactual, strategies that align the absorption of aid more closely to spending and hence smooth the path for seigniorage can substantially close off this source of macroeconomic volatility. Both the crawl (Panel D) and a buffer plus float (Panel E) do rather well in these circumstances. In both cases, but particularly under the crawl, the disruptive volatility in inflation and the real exchange rate are greatly reduced. The sharp deflationary impact under the pure float is substantially eliminated, with prices falling by 3.5% under the buffer plus float and virtually not at all under the crawl, compared to a 9% fall under the pure float. By the same token, the initial real exchange rate appreciation is pegged back to around 1.9% under the crawl and 4% under the buffer plus float compared to 8% under a pure float and the strong recessionary pressures on non-traded output are completely avoided.
These latter rules entail substantial reserve accumulation, and although the patterns of accumulation are broadly similar under either rule, as indeed are the real outcomes, the two approaches are not the same. Moreover, the superior performance of the crawl observed here is reinforced if the model is re-calibrated to reflect a pre-stabilization situation in which inflation is initially higher and the fiscal authorities are more likely to direct a proportion of aid towards deficit reduction: in such a setting an aggressive crawl is significantly more effective than the buffer plus float strategy.
The reason the crawl contributes to a much smoother adjustment path is that it aligns movements in the nominal exchange rate much more closely to the modest real exchange rate adjustment required to absorb the aid inflow, while the (unsterilized) liquidity injection arising from reserve accumulation forestalls the contraction in the domestic money supply observed under the float. Instead, the increased demand for liquidity as a result of the decline in the seigniorage requirement is accommodated without requiring a sharp price adjustment so that the economy responds to the aid inflow with virtually stable prices. Domestic output is hardly affected, and total private spending follows a smoother path. While the buffer plus float strategy goes some way to delivering this same outcome it does so less efficiently since it involves reserve accumulation with respect to the unspent portion of aid only -thereby serving to efficiently match the supply of domestic money -but does not fully accommodate changes in the demand for domestic money arising from the fall in expected inflation. In the simulations reported in Panels D and E, for example, the buffer plus float entails rather more up-front intervention than the crawl but rather less over the remainder of the simulation. As the inflation elasticity of the demand for money rises, this distinction becomes more marked and the buffer plus float does less well in aligning the demand and supply of domestic liquidity compared to the float.
Aid shocks with an open capital account
These simulations suggest that when deficit-reduction considerations are important, active foreign exchange intervention with little or no sterilization of increases in the monetary base serves to accommodate changed in the increased demand for money associated with declining inflation and delivers a more attractive way of smoothing macroeconomic volatility than relying on a pure float. These results assume, however, that domestic asset markets are fully insulated from the rest of the world. In the next section we consider whether these results remain pertinent as the capital account is liberalized de facto. Table 3 illustrates the impact of incorporating foreign participation in the domestic public debt market. Drawing on the recent experience of countries such as Zambia and Ghana we assume that foreign investors hold 15 percent of debt in the initial steady state (equivalent to 1% of GDP). We allow for a modest elasticity with respect to the country risk premium by setting 0.15
There are, to the best of our knowledge, no reliable estimates of this parameter, but preliminary sensitivity analysis with our model suggest that the qualitative characteristics of our results are monotonic in .
φ
In the case where all aid is spent as it is received, integration with world capital markets via foreign bond holders allows for smoother aggregate adjustment to the aid shock than was previously the case. The results are sufficiently similar under a float / buffer plus float and the crawl in this case that it suffices to report only the results for the pure float.
Relative to the closed capital account case, adjustment entails significantly more muted movements in domestic nominal and relative prices, while the short run boom in aggregate consumption and non-traded output is substantially eliminated. These smoother paths for consumption and production are facilitated by larger current account adjustments. With an open capital account, the private sector's consumption is less procyclical as it can now smooth more efficiently over the temporary aid flow by indirectly accumulating net foreign assets via the bond market. 10 In the limiting case shown in panel B of Table 3 , where we allow 0 φ → , so that the economy's financial terms of trade are invariant to the shock, the economy follows a textbook adjustment to a temporary income shock (recalling that the data-generating process for the aid shock is known to the private sector). The real interest rate does not move and consumption adjusts rapidly and permanently to the annuity value of the increase to aggregate wealth represented by the temporary aid shock.
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The results in Panels A and B give the impression that greater capital account openness creates an important additional degree of freedom for efficient adjustment to external shocks and that this necessarily smoothes the adjustment path for the economy. As the results in Panels C to E suggest, however, this is false when some fraction of the aid inflow is used for deficit reduction purposes: if anything, the open capital account raises the stakes. In this case the open capital account exacerbates the adjustment problem under the float (Panel C) and accentuates the wedge between the float on the one hand and the crawl (Panel D)and buffer plus crawl (Panel E) on the other. This is seen most clearly if we focus on the costs of the real exchange rate appreciation for the non-traded sector. Previously, the limited capacity of the private sector to acquire foreign assets ensured that aggregate consumption was quite strongly pro-cyclical, and this in turn limited the contractionary effects of real exchange rate appreciation on the non-traded sector.
With a more open capital account, however, the private sector is better placed to smooth aggregate consumption with the result that aggregate demand effects provide less support to the non-traded sector, exposing it to a much sharper contraction than before.
By contrast, the properties of the crawl and buffer plus float strategies, in which reserve accumulation serves to avoid nominal and real exchange rate overshooting, change relatively little when we allow for foreign participation in domestic debt markets. As such, the relative benefits from pursing these strategies over the pure float, in terms of facilitating a smooth macroeconomic adjustment to deficit-reducing aid shocks, are further enhanced in the presence of a more open capital account. The central insights from our earlier work are preserved and even reinforced when the capital account is open n open capital account: when aid is used to substitute for seigniorage the incipient portfolio adjustment by the private sector in response to changes in expected inflation will dominate macroeconomic dynamics and ensure that efficient adjustment to temporary aid surges entails a fairly heavy degree of unsterilized foreign exchange intervention, either under an explicit exchange rate crawl or through the operation of a buffer plus float rule. This result is not surprising. The fundamental factor underpinning the volatility observed when the domestic government debt market is closed is the domestic private sector's incipient portfolio adjustment, between domestic and foreign currency. Opening the domestic debt market serves to anchor the real return on debt, which may have important implications for interest sensitive expenditure in the public and private sectors, but given that bonds do not generate liquidity services (or, in an alternative set-up, satisfy cash in advance constraints) the open capital account by itself does not eliminate the domestic agent's portfolio problem.
Burden-sharing and bond sterilization
The discussion so far has focused on monetary policy from the perspective of alternative degrees of commitment to a floating exchange rate. In doing so, we have seen how the crawl and buffer plus float each end up allocating 100 percent of the burden of liquidity control to foreign exchange sales. Macroeconomic adjustment is smooth, suggesting that there is no obvious case for shifting any of the burden to bond operations. In practice, however, central banks in Africa often feel compelled to adhere to strict monetary targets and match intervention with active bond sterilization. This is particularly so in the context of the IMF-supported financial programmes, most of which are predicated on the assumption of a constant velocity of circulation over the short to medium term. Table 5 illustrates the case where the domestic currency value of aid spending is exactly matched by sales of foreign exchange and government securities in the share [ In either case, these sterilization rules are decisively dominated by the buffer plus float and crawl which rely on foreign exchange sales alone to manage domestic liquidity growth for aid-funded spending. Panels A and B of Table 3 illustrate the case in which aid is fully spent -so that seigniorage requirements are stationary. In this case, bond sterilization, whether partial or full, merely imparts a substantial dose of conventional 'unpleasant arithmetic', with higher domestic debt service costs contributing to persistent domestic inflation over the horizon and a steady depreciation in the nominal exchange rate. Moreover, as the memorandum items indicate, the real interest rate (RIR) and the budget deficit (def) under bond sterilization are both substantially higher than under the comparable buffer plus float run reported in Table 1 .
Opening the capital account does little to alter this picture. As the comparison of Panels B and C indicates, the adjustment path for the economy is virtually unchanged beyond the change in the composition of debt holdings arising from the sterilization rule. The path for the real interest rate is pegged slightly tighter to the foreign bond rate (adjusted for the expected real exchange rate appreciation), debt service costs are consequently marginally lower across the response horizon and the paths for inflation and the real exchange rate very slightly smoother. But overall, these differences are nugatory. Moreover, the results do not change substantially as the elasticity of the foreign bond supply increases: even with a perfectly open capital account the same outcomes prevail for this particular shock and response. The reason is that the sterilization rule in operation here --where the bond issue is conditioned directly and exclusively on the fiscal response to the aid shock -is invariant to the evolution of the intermediate target such as reserve money or indeed to the evolution of inflation. As such, the chosen volume of sterilization is independent of capital market conditions so that the fiscal burden of sterilization varies only in terms of the variations in the real interest rate which, as noted changes relatively little with changes in the elasticity of foreign bond supply. Indeed, as the results presented in Table 3 show, this particular rule does not do a particularly good job in controlling inflation. To fully understand the consequences of capital account liberalization on the properties of sterilization rules, including the implications for the offset between bond sterilization and the path of reserves, requires an examination of a wider range of settings for the intervention and bond reaction functions, a task beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusions
We argued at the beginning of this paper that central bankers in Africa face substantial problems in managing aid surges. In practice, many appear to have adopted strategies involving substantial intervention and reserve accumulation in response to aid surges, accompanied in many cases by fairly aggressive bond sterilization. Our simulations suggest that when currency substitution is active, this pattern is consistent with an efficient monetary policy response to an aid surge, and particularly so when a portion of the aid will be used for inflation stabilization. Conditional on these portfolio effects, however, there is essentially no role for bond sterilization during an aid surge, at least when the capital account is closed. Moreover, we find that the relative properties of the alternative rules are robust to relaxing the assumption that the domestic bond market is entirely closed to external influences. We show that while foreign participation in the domestic bond market allows for more efficient adjustment when aid flows are fully spent, this does not carry over to the case in which aid alters the trajectory for domestic deficit financing. In the latter case, foreign bondholders exacerbate the short-run tradeoffs facing the monetary authority and strengthen the appeal of temporary reserve accumulation.
Monetary policy has a complex mandate in Sub-Saharan Africa, where conventional objectives of macroeconomic stability coexist with an interest in facilitating the development of financial markets. While we have emphasized the appeal of temporary reserve accumulation in the face of an aid surge, there is a sharp divergence between how this is accomplished under a crawl and a buffer plus float. In a crawl, the monetary authority targets the exchange rate, while in a buffer plus float intervention coincides with aid-financed spending in a version of reserve-money targeting. The two approaches have widely divergent implications for how the exchange rate responds to other shocks, and therefore for the patterns of volatility facing portfolio holders (and their assumptions regarding the nominal anchor). Our current DSGE treats the parameters of portfolio behavior as exogenous to these variations in monetary policy behavior. We are therefore ignoring any impact of alternative rules on the trajectory of financial market development. This is an important area for further work. 
